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TRUST-FUND DOCTRINE REVISITED
PART I1*

A

JAMES R. ELLIS and CHARLES L. SAYRE

the "trust-fund" courts pushed their doctrine far
beyond the rules of preferential transfers. Actions by creditors
to enforce unpaid stock subscriptions and to recover assets wrongfully distributed to shareholders were soon brought within the scope
of this growing theory, despite strong criticism that these actions
should never have been stamped with the "trust-fund" label." From
its inception the Washington court treated the duty of a shareholder
to pay his subscription as an asset belonging to the "trust fund,""
and soon thereafter rights of creditors to recover unlawful dividends
were swept up in the same judicial tide. 8 This expanded content of
the trust fund was said in Gaunce v. Schoder ° to encompass "property in the possession of the corporation, accounts receivable, choses
in action, claims of various kinds, as well as unpaid stock subscriptions, payments made to creditors in preference of the rights of other
creditors, statutory claims against officers and trustees and rights
against stockholders for dividends paid out of capital."'7 This quotation shows that the doctrine has penetrated a larger area of the law
of corporations than permits of coverage here. Thus the recovery by
creditors of corporate assets distributed to shareholders, while linked
to the trust-fund theory in Washington, is a topic requiring separate
treatment.
We have chosen the problem of recovery of unpaid subscriptions to
illustrate the influence of the trust fund doctrine in our jurisdiction
upon actions by creditors against shareholders.
UNPAID STOCK SUBSCRIPTIONS THE RATIONALE OF RECOVERY
Sawyer v. Hoag72 established that the stockholders of an insolvent
corporation were liable to its creditors to the extent of the amount
unpaid on stock subscriptions. Justice Miller based liability squarely
AN EARLY DAY

* Part I of this article appeared in 24 WASH. L. Rav. 44.
ADDENDA TO PART I The writers wish to point out that the statement appearing in
24 WASH. L. REv. at page 49 to the effect that appointment of a receiver would follow
"as a matter of course," should not be taken to indicate that the court is without discretion in the matter. REm. REv. STAT. § 9741 states that a receiver may be appointed
by the court upon a showing of insolvency "when the court in its sound discretion
deems that the appointment of a receiver is necessary to secure ample 3ustice to the
parties."
67 5 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (4th) §§ 2319-2331.
88 Burch v. Taylor, 1 Wash. 245, 24 Pac. 438 (1890).
89Mitchell v. Jordan, 36 Wash. 645, 79 Pac. 311 (1905).
70 145 Wash. 604, 261 Pac. 393 (1927).
7
1Id.at 605.
72 17 Wall. 610, 21 L. Ed. 731 (1873).
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on the trust-fund doctrine, saying that the doctrine applied to the
capital stock of a corporation "especially its unpaid subscriptions." 3
This holding carved a significant exception out of the general rule
that stockholders of a corporation are insulated from liability for its
debts.
As long as a corporation remains solvent the subscriber's only liability runs to the corporation.7' Once the corporation has matured the
contract liability of the shareholder, it can, of course, assign that debt
like any other. But except by way of assignment, the creditor of a
solvent corporation, being in no sense a party to the subscription contract, is unable to reach an unpaid subscription. Practically speaking,
however, as long as the corporation is solvent a corporate creditor will
not need to pursue any remedy beyond a direct action against the
corporation taken to judgment; hence any absence of privity between
creditor and shareholder is not at this time a serious problem. But
when the corporation becomes insolvent judgments at law are relatively worthless. At this juncture the trust-fund doctrine entered the
picture to protect the creditor.
The statutes of the territory of Washungton early provided that every
stockholder "shall be personally liable to the creditors of the company
to the amount of what remains unpaid upon subscription. 7 5 This provision was re-enacted in- subsequent years with no significant change,"
and was incorporated in the state constitution."7 Against the background of the times it is easy to see how the judicial implementation
of these provisions would follow trust-fund channels. Thus Judge
7
Dunbar in the early case of Adamant Manufacturing Co. v. Wallace 1
quoted the then current text, Morawetz, On Private Corporations,as
follows:
The liability of the shareholders to contribute their shares as capital is
treated in equity as assets, like other legal claims belonging to the corporation. This liability, together with the capital actually contributed, constitutes
the trust fund which
in equity is deemed pledged for the payment of the
79
corporate debts.
73Id. at 620.

7413 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS (Perm. Ed.) § 6056, BALLANTINE CORPORATIONS (Rev. Ed.) § 340; Under REM. REV. STAT. § 3803-22 the corporation is given a lien on shares to the amount of the unpaid subscription and sale is
authorized.
75 CoDE PROC. 1881 § 2434.
70 REm.REv. STAT. § 3824.
77 WASH. CoNsT. Art. XII § 4 states, "Each stockholder
shall be liable for the
debts of the corporation to the amount of his unpaid stock and no more.
78 16 Wash. 614, 48 Pac. 415 (1897).
79 Id. at 618 quoting 2 MoRAWETz, PRxVATE CORPORATIONS § 820.
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In the same vein our first state court in Burch v. Taylor 0 had pre-

viously held that a corporate creditor could not maintain an action at
law for an unpaid subscription against a stockholder even though our
statute made shareholders "personally liable to the creditors." The
court reasoned that since stock subscriptions were part of the trust
fund for the payment of creditors "to enforce a right to participate
in a trust fund requires proceedings in equity "'I In Montessano V.
Carr the court went further to hold that a petition by a creditor for
money judgment at law against a delinquent subscriber would not
support a granting of equitable relief even under the code. "We think
the real nature of the action is that of a creditor's bill where the creditor prosecutes for himself and all other creditors, in view of the fact
that he is seeking payment of his claim from a trust fund against
which his rights are not preferred, but the same as other creditors."'"
One argument advanced in support of equitable jurisdiction was the
prevention of multiple suits by the several creditors against each of
the delinquent subscribers, but the idea of equality was again the real
moving force: "To allow a single creditor to maintain an action at
law against one or more shareholders for his own benefit would be
unjust to other creditors."'" With the tenor of approach set firmly in
equity, the statutory provision in effect became merely a reaffirmation
of common law liability under the trust-fund doctrine.
Once the cause of action under our statute was construed to be an
action under the trust-fund doctrine various refinements of that doctrine began to appear in the cases. The court soon had to define the
place of unpaid subscriptions in the trust fund and determine at what
time the trust arose. "The capital stock of the corporation constitutes
the trust fund," said the court in Hosner v. Conservathve Casualty Co."5
Under the general American rule and the statutes of most states this
does not mean the capital stock as stated in the articles of incorporation, but rather the capital stock as actually created by the subscription contracts."8 In answer to the argument that the part of the subscription price over and above par value did not constitute capital
so Note 68 supra.

81 Burch v. Taylor, note 68 supra at 248.

80 Wash. 384, 141 Pac. 894, 7 A. L. R. 95 (1914).
Id. at 390, citing New York National Exchange Bank v. Metropolitan Savings
Bank, 28 Wash. 553, 68 Pac. 905 (1902), Chilberg v. Siebebaum, 41 Wash. 663, 84 Pac.
598 (1906).
84 Wilson v. Book, 13 Wash. 676, 679, 43 Pac. 939 (1896).
85 99 Wash. 161, 164, 168 Pac. 1122 (1917).
88 18 C. J. S. 1309.
82
88
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stock for trust-fund purposes our court held in Johns v. ClotherT that

where a subscription price was $150 per share and par value of the
shares was only $ioo the shareholder would be liable to creditors for
the full $z5o. The court states that the constitutional limitation of the
stockholder's liability to "the amount of his unpaid stock and no more"
was only a limitation upon the implied legal undertaking to pay for
the capital stock at par regardless of contract, and was not a limitation
upon the power of a stockholder to contract with the corporation to
pay more and build up a surplus fund upon which creditors could presumably rely Thus our early statute was sustained in its direction
that the amount named in the subscription determine the extent of
liability rather than the amount of that subscription attributed to
capital stock. In 1933 the Uniform Business Corporations Act reenacted this rule in even more unequivocal language.8 In the absence
of watering, the amount named in a subscription promse payable in
money has invariably been held to be an absolute ceiling on the liability of subscribers in private corporations. 8
We have seen that the application of the trust-fund doctrine to
preferences was limited in time to the period after a corporation became insolvent. Preferential transfers made before insolvency were
beyond the pale of creditor challenge. Not so, however, with the
liability of the shareholder for his unpaid subscriptions. While insolvency of the corporation is a condition precedent to a creditor's
suit in equity to collect the subscription, once this condition is satisfied the creditor or receiver will be able to attack agreements between
the corporation and the subscriber made even while the corporation
was solvent. Thus in Johns v. Clother0 the creditor was successful
even though the corporation while solvent had estopped itself from
collecting the full subscription by agreeing that half the price need
never be paid. The rights of receiver in such a case may well rise
above the corporation's right to sue on the contract, indicating that
even before insolvency the subscribed capital "so far has that inchoate
character as to prevent it from being surrendered or given away by
the corporation.
78 Wash. 602, 139 Pac. 755 (1914).
ss Rzm. Rzv. STAT. § 3803-20 (2).
87

80 See as to liability of stockholders in banking or insurance corporations or joint
stock associations, WASH. CONST. Art. XII § II and REm. Rxv. STAT. § 3242 [P P C.

§ 309-43].
90
Note 87 supra.
9

1 Thons and Brenneman v. Goodman, 254 Fed. 39, 41 (C.C. A. 6th 1918).
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The trust-fund doctrine is not the sole rationale for the recovery of
unpaid subscriptions. A theory which often creeps into our court's
treatment of of creditors' actions against shareholders has been termed
the "reliance" or "fraud" theory In essence this theory states that
the shareholders and the corporation have combined to hold the company out as having a certain amount of capital stock; that in reliance
on this represented fund creditors are presumed to have extended credit
and that therefore the creditor should be able to recover from the
shareholder according to the tenor of the representation. An illustration of this approach is contained in the Clother case where the court
extended the reliance idea to cover surplus as well as capital stock
saying "the contract of subscription to the surplus fund was intended,
on its face, to create an additional asset upon which creditors might
rely, and to which they might resort." "2
A necessary corollary of this rule would seem to be proof that the
extension of credit had been made while this apparent resource appeared on the company books. This is the general rule in jurisdictions
following the "fraud" theory" In the Washington case of Murphy v.
Panton9" the creditors were wholesalers who had furmshed goods after
a purported cancellation of a subscription agreement. They were held
to be "existing creditors within the meaning of the term as it is employed in cases of this kind"; 5 however, the court relied strongly on
the existence of a course of dealing extending before the time of cancellation.
Watered stock distingutsked. In a large number of suits brought by
creditors the subscriber has actually paid for his stock but with property worth less than the par value of his shares. The majority of
American courts treat efforts by creditors to recover in these "watered
stock" situations under the "fraud" theory " It is important to distinguish at this point between the subscriber who is bound by contract
02 Johns v. Clother, note 87 supra at 611. This liability to pay more than par if subscription so states has been generally upheld. 13 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS (Perm. Ed.) § 6064.
0"However, most courts have not followed the "fraud" theory in suits purely upon
subscriptions which have not been paid up to the satisfaction of the corporation. The
"fraud" theory is generally applied to actions where the corporation has accepted less
than full value as payment. Where the action is upon a genuine "unpaid" subscription
the trust fund theory has been the general American rule and under this theory creditors
who extended credit before or after the shareholder subscribed are equally able to recover. 13 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS (Perm. Ed.) § 6119.

BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS

§

783.

:196 Wash. 637, 165 Pac. 1074 (1917).
5 Id. at 643.

9611 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS (Perm.

Ed.) § 5232.
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to the corporation to pay a definite amount of money when certain
conditions occur and the subscriber who has purported to pay the
amount due by transferring property which is overvalued, or has paid
cash less than the subscription price under an agreement with the
corporation. The former case is one of pure contract liability to the
corporation and constitutes the true action for an unpaid subscription.
In the watered stock cases the creditors' action sounds primarily in
tort. There the shareholder has satisfied his liability to the company
and since there is no obligation running to the corporation there is
nothing tangible to place in a corporate trust fund for creditors. The
courts have found "fraud" to be the basis of recovery in such cases
whether statute so provided or not. Our court while sometimes using
trust-fund language has generally applied rules of fraud to these cases.
Under these rules only creditors who dealt with the corporation after
issue of the fictitiously paid stock and upon the faith of its being
properly paid up can recover.17 Thus in Sequm v. Plano"5 credit was
extended to a coal mining company whose stock, issued as fully paid,
had not, in fact, been paid up. The creditor knew at the time that the
undertaking was purely speculative and the court dewed him recovery
Again in Johnsen v. The PheasantPickling Co." the court held that
in actions to recover upon stock subscriptions paid for in overvalued
property it must be shown that the creditor had no knowledge of the
overvaluation. The burden of proof on this point was placed upon the
creditor."' This despite the prior holding in the Cloth1er 01 case that
the burden of showing the creditor had not relied upon the surplus
fund created by the subscriptions rested upon the shareholder. The
Clother case did not involve the problems of property valuation, but
if the court has intended to distinguish its requirements as to burden of
proof on that ground, no indication of this appears in either opimonY' 2
97 Inland Nursery and Floral Co. v. Rice, 57 Wash. 67, 106 Pac. 499 (1910), Beddow v. Huston, 65 Wash. 585, 118 Pac. 782 (1911), Chamberlain v. Piercy, 82 Wash.
157, 143 Pac. 977 (1914), Colville Valley Coal Co. v. Rogers, 123 Wash. 360, 212 Pac.
732 (1923), Johnsen v. Pheasant Pickling Co., 174 Wash. 236, 24 P (2d) 628 (1933),
cf. Snyder v. Yalama Finance Corp., 174 Wash. 499, 25 P (2d) 108 (1933).
0s 160 Wash. 421, 295 Pac. 179 (1931).
00 174 Wash. 236, 24 P (2d) 628 (1933), Guaranty Trust Co. v. Satterwhite, 2
Wn.(2d) 252, 97 P.(2d) 1055 (1940).
100 This accords with the general rule. 4 FLETcHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF PRIVATE CORPORATOiNS (Perm. Ed.) § 1713.
102.Note 87 supra.
102
The Clother case involved an insurance company and the holding as to burden
may have been explained on the close resemblance to banking institutions. The normal
rule as to banks places the burden on the subscriber. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS (Rev.

Ed.) § 342.
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Where stock has been issued by a corporation the shareholder can, of
course, take advantage of the presumption that all issued stock has
been fully paid for. But once the creditor has proved that the stock
was not, in fact, fully paid for, should he further be required to prove
that he actually gave credit believing that payment in full had been
made? Under trust-fund rationale he would be excused from such
proof, whereas under the "fraud" theory, advanced by our court in
the watered stock cases, he must bear this further burden.
Many courts hold that a creditor's state of rmnd is wholly immaterial to recovery I's As a practical matter creditors of going concerns seldom extend credit on the faith of a capital stock item on a
balance sheet. The ordinary unsecured creditor would be more interested in the ratio of current assets to current liabilities if he did
peruse the balance sheet. In all probability, however, he has never
seen the books and his credit was extended upon the general reputation
of the company as a credit risk. In the face of these facts a simple,
pragmatic rule aimed at protecting creditors regardless of their knowledge of the corporate stock structure, has distinct advantages over a
rule based on a fictitious reliance and then purporting to distinguish
cases on a presence or absence of this reliance. Such a rule would be
more in harmony with the facts of business life and would reduce
accounting complications during receivership.
In true actions for unpaid subscriptions the shareholder has paid
nothing or made a partial payment on account. His liability runs to
the corporation and is solely based on the subscription contract. Since
the contract is between the subscriber and the corporation, creditors
would not normally be in privity If the corporation has matured the
contract liability by a call or assessment then it has on hand an assignable liquid debt and the receiver or creditors acting as equitable assignees can collect whatever remains unpaid. But if the corporation
has made no call and refuses to do so there is no matured debt. The
terms of the contract do not expressly contemplate a maturing of the
subscriber's obligation at the call of strangers, unless the statutory or
common law rights of creditors upon insolvency are read into the contract. Our court early held that failure of the directors to make a call
before appointment of a receiver would not defeat a creditor's suit
after the corporation became insolvent.' The obligation of each sub103 BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS (Rev. Ed.) § 351 and cases listed n. 29; 2 GLENN,
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES (Rev. Ed.) § 608.
104 McKay v. Elwood, 12 Wash. 579, 41 Pac. 919 (1895), Adamant Manufacturing

Co. v. Wallace, 16 Wash. 614, 48 Pac. 415 (1897).
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scriber was upon insolvency treated as a debt presently due and the
court order as equivalent to the director's call. This is the rule in most
states. Some courts reason along "equitable garnishment" lines that
the receiver stands in the corporation's shoes for purposes of making
the call, corporate performance of this condition in the subscriber's
contract being accomplished through the receiver. The creditor's bill
26
proceeding is treated as substantially equivalent to receivership.
The critical hinge in any line of reasoning here is the granting of a
right to mature and enforce the subscription contract to creditor or
receiver. There is normally no volitional act on the part of the corporation equivalent to assignment m fact, for the creditors are the real
actors. Any assignment rationale has an element of fiction in it. In
fact, the right of the creditor to sue on this contract is raised by operation of law from the relationship of the subscriber to the corporate
debtor and the eixstence of insolvency Once his right to sue be granted
the creditor's action sounds essentially in contract. Any explanation
of the creditor's right to sue as rising other than by operation of law
necessarily relies upon fiction. In essence the shareholder's obligation
is rooted in his contract, but the creditor's right to reach that obligation stems from a special rule of law That rule in this jurisdiction has
been the trust-fund doctrine or its statutory counterpart.
As this discussion indicates our judges have not followed one simonpure rationale in dealing with all suits against subscribers. The cases
contain "trust fund," "reliance," and "contract" ideas. The few recent
Washington cases facing the general problem have not mentioned the
words "trust fund, 10 7 but if there be an aversion to such terminology
there has been little change in the fundamental rules applied. The
sloughmg-off of old names is not too difficult in this area where the
basic tenets of the holdings have been justifiable on general equity
grounds and not absolutely dependent on the finding of either express
or constructive trust. The critics in this area of the doctrine have been
chiefly irked with the use of trust rationale and have not quarreled
greatly with the case results.
WAYS AND MEANS OF RECOVERY

We have seen that the corporate creditor seeking to recover from
a subscriber the amount of his unpaid subscription after the corpora105 13 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF PRIVATE CORORATIONS (Pern. Ed.) § 6089.

Spencer v. Anderson, 193 Cal. 1, 222 Pac. 355, 35 A. L. R. 822 (1924).
supra, the court talked as if the
liability was purely statutory. In Guaranty Trust Co. v. Satterwhite, note 99 supra, the
court talked in terms of contract liability only.
100

107 In Johnsen v. Pheasant Pickling Co., note 97
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tion has become insolvent must bring his action in equity He may
petition the court for the appointment of a receiver or in the alternative may maintain a creditor's bill for the benefit of all the company
creditors. In either event our court requires a certain procedure for
the protection of the shareholders. A solvent corporation may proceed
against some subscribers and not against others, and it is no defense
to such actions that there has not been a marshalling of assets or that
all the delinquent shareholders have not been proceeded against.' 8
However, when the corporation becomes insolvent, a different rule
applies and it was held in Beddow v. Huston' that all delinquent
shareholders must be given notice and an opportunity to be heard and
that there must be an effort to collect a prorata share of the creditor's
claims from all the delinquents. The action is in two cohesive phases.
In the first the receiver petitions the court to assess the subscribers
and to authorize suit against them. In this action notice and opportunity to be heard must be given to all the subscribers and the receiver
must satisfy the court that there are creditors' claims which can only
be met by collecting the unpaid subscriptions. The court order then
made is an assessment maturing the obligation of the subscriber to pay
and a direction that the receiver sue the stockholders on their obligations. It is conclusive as to the necessity of assessment but only establishes przma facie the personal liability of the shareholders on their
subscriptions. The second phase consists in suits against the subscribers under the assessment. Our court held in Johnsen v. The
Pheasant Pickling Co." 0 that these dual actions must initially be
brought against all the delinquent shareholders and not against any
single one. Further the suit must be "for such an amount, as together
with the admitted assets would be sufficient to meet the liabilities of
the company "" The process of collecting only a part of the unpaid
subscription is not the universal rule" 2 and may be open to serious
question on principle. The paid up shareholders of the company have
at least a secondary interest in an insolvent corporation. Fairness
would seem to dictate that all delinquent subscribers pay their full
subscriptions and that any surplus over creditors' claims be ratably
distributed among the shareholders. The equity court having taken
108 Gaunce v. Schoder, 145 Wash. 603, 261 Pac. 393 (1927).
109 65 Wash. 585, 118 Pac. 752 (1911) , Johnsen v. Pheasant Pickling Co., 174 Wash.
236, 24 P. (2d) 628 (1933), Guaranty Trust Co. v. Satterwhite, 2 Wn. (2d) 252, 97
P.(2d) 1055 (1940).
110 Note 97 supra at 243.
M11
Id.
112 BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS (Rev. Ed.) § 340.
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over the assets of the insolvent, could easily effectuate this more complete collection and disbursement through the medium of, the receiver.
Again this would simplify the work of the receiver, for he could dispense with the difficult problem of determining the amount of each
shareholder's prorata liability, a calculation only capable of approximate correctness in view of the variable collectibility of any judgments
he might get.
SHAREHOLDER'S DEFENSES

A wide variety of defenses may be urged by subscribers who are
under fire from corporate creditors. However, in general the subscriber
has fewer arguments available against creditors than he could have
used against the corporation. These defenses are treated in thorough
style by Fletcher in his work on corporations,"' and no attempt is
here made to cover so broad a field. We undertake to point out only a
few of those defenses which the Washington court has encountered,
and to show the variety of results that can be expected under differing
rationales.
Statute of limitations. The normal contracts statutes of limitation
have been held to apply to actions to enforce a stockholder's liability
on'his subscription in Washington. " ' In Guaranty Trust Co. v. SatterWhite,"' after noting that the two year period for statutory causes had
been declared applicable in Johnsen v. The Pheasant Pickling Co.,11
the court expressly chose to adopt the contracts period of limitation,
relying on the earlier case of Guaranty Trust Co. v. Scoon.11 ' This
placed Washington in line with the majority rule.' The period of
limitations has been consistently held to run from the date of the court
assessment.1 9 In this connection it is important to distinguish between
stock subscriptions which have been called in, either automatically or
by act of the directors, and stock subscriptions which have never been
called befdre the date of court assessment. If a call has been made the
statute begins to run from that time against, both the corporation and
its creditors. However, where there has been no call by the corporation,
and this is the situation we have been generally assuming, the period of
limitations does not begin to run until the court makes its assessment.
OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS (Penn. Ed.)
114 Guaranty Trust Co. v. Scoon, 144 Wash. 33, 256 Pac. 74 (1927).
1152 Wn.(2d) 252, 97 P.(2d) 1055 (1940).
11s 4 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA

§ 1610 et. seq.

.1Note 97 supra.
127 Note 114 supra.
11s

4 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS (Perm. Ed.) § 1932.

119 Id. § 1933.

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

Thus, in Washington the six-year statute will govern in the case of
written stock subscriptions. The theoretical basis for holding the cause
of action to be contractual has been previously covered.
Rescisswn of subscriptwn agreement. A subscriber may rescind his
subscription agreement with a solvent corporation substantially as he
may rescind any contract. 2 ' Some courts have held, however, that once
the corporation has become insolvent a subscription to capital stock
can not be rescinded, on the theory that at the moment the corporation
becomes insolvent all the assets at once become a trust fund for the
creditors.12' The Washington court, however, pointed out in Atwood v.
McKenzie-Waterhouse Co.,'2" that such reasoning "loses sight of the
fact that the trust fund doctrine is itself based on equitable principles,
and that it should yield to equities which are superior." The great
weight of American authority holds that a subscriber may rescind even
after insolvency under certain conditions. 2 ' Our court has stated that a
stockholder may interpose the defense of fraud even after insolvency,
except as to creditors whose claims accrued subsequent to his becomng
a stockholder. Thus where the creditor's debt was in existence at the
time of the subscription, the subscriber may rescind for fraud. Since
many subscriptions are made in the early stages of corporate development and will pre-exist most credit extensions, the Washington rule
allows rescission after insolvency to a very limited group of subscribers.
This approach is closely related to our court's use of the "reliance"
theory The Atwood case is settled law but strong argument against it
may be made. There should be no magic in the status of subsequent
creditor. In absence of laches in repudiating the contract properly the
question is whether defrauded subscribers should be made subordinate
to corporate creditors after insolvency In England they clearly are.
The question has been hedged by most American courts along the lines
of the Atwood case.
12 0 REm. REV. STAT.

§ 3803-6 (2).

121 BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS (Rev. Ed.)
122 120 Wash. 214, 206 Pac. 978, 41 A. L. R.

§ 342.

650 (1922). At page 218 the court states
the rule "he who has been induced by fraudulent representations to subscribe for capital
stock of a corporation may rescind after the corporation has become insolvent and has
been placed in the hands of a receiver, if he has not been guilty of any laches in discovering the fraud practiced upon him and in repudiating the transaction after discovering the fraud, and has not in the meantime participated in the affairs and business of the
corporation, and has not been guilty of any affirmative act which might mislead others
to their detriment, and no person has become a creditor of the corporation after his
subscription was made." In Chandler v. Miller, 172 Wash. 252, 19 P. (2d) 1108 (1933)
the rule of the Atwood case was approved but held not applicable to suits to enforce
superadded liability imposed by law. Atwood rule stated as the general rule in Rummens
v. Home Savings and Loan Ass'n, 182 Wash 539, 543, 47 P.(2d) 845 (1935).
123 BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS (Rev. Ed.) § 342.
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CONCLUSIONS
The general provisions of the Uniform Business Corporations Act on
shareholders' liabilities to creditors for unpaid subscriptions is little
different from our earliest statute. As construed, the Act has left the
case law essentially as it had previously been laid down by the courts.
We may conclude that in the future trust language will be sparingly
used, but the case holdings decided under that theory are unquestionably alive. Properly presented, they should be compelling upon our
court. The true stock subscription action seems to be currently viewed
as having its germ in contract with an equitable power to sue in the
receiver or creditors. The power to sue is based on operation of statute
or broad equity rules, rather than trust theory This is surely a sound
semantic development and accords with the trend in other jurisdictions.
However, insolvency cases have been relatively scarce in this prosperous decade and the shape of the new approach is not yet certain.
The watered stock problems have been reduced but by no means
eliminated through use of no-par and nominal-par shares. In this area
the "fraud" theory of recovery is firmly settled but sound policy may
dictate a broadening of creditors' rights by statute. A pragmatic rule
seems desirable that will allow all creditors to compel the payment by a
subscriber of full par value or full subscription price, whichever is
greater, in event of corporate insolvency In the absence of estoppel,
waiver or other bar to Ins action, no creditor, whether he has relied on
the capital stock or not, should be demed the right to reach subscriptions.
The statute should provide that the creditors' remedies continue to be
equitable in nature and maintain procedural protection for the subscribers. The court should have power under proper circumstances to
require all subscribers to pay the full amount of their subscription to
the receiver for equitable distribution among the creditors and paid up
shareholders upon insolvency
There is a need for definite rules burdened by no underlying artificial
theory and based plainly upon a policy to protect creditors and shareholders alike from subscribers seeking to retain an expectant interest in
corporate success while insulating themselves from the responsibilities
of corporate failure.

